A philosophical outlook on potential conflicts between planetary protection, astrobiology and commercial use of space by Persson, Erik
hapterC 9
A PHILOSOPHICAL OUTLOOK ON POTENTIAL 
CONFLICTS BETWEEN PLANETARY PROTECTION, 
ASTROBIOLOGY AND COMMERCIAL USE OF SPACE
Erik Persson
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to use philosophy and, in particular ethical theory, 
to identify and explore some potential conflicts between planetary protection, 
astrobiology and commercial use of space.
According to NASA’s astrobiology roadmap, astrobiology is a research field 
that addresses the following questions: ‘How does life begin and evolve, does 
life exist elsewhere in the universe, and what is the future of life on Earth and 
beyond?’ (Des Marais et al. 2003; 2008). I will, however, concentrate on the most 
well-known and most curious part, namely the search for life outside our planet. 
This might sound a lot like science fiction, and the truth is of course, that we have 
still not found any extra-terrestrial life (at least, not at the time of writing). The 
search for extraterrestrial life is not science fiction, however. It is, in fact, a very 
serious scientific endeavour that the scientific community judge to have a high 
probability of success in the not too distant future. The fact that we have still to 
find extraterrestrial life also makes it an unusually suitable subject for ethical 
discussions. Contrary to what is typically the case on our own Earth, the fact that 
we have not yet found any extraterrestrial life gives ethics a chance to influence 
our decisions from the beginning, instead of just pointing out where we went 
wrong ex-post-facto.
Commercial use of space might seem just as much like science fiction as the 
discovery of extraterrestrial life, but the fact is, it is already happening (see Beavin 
2008; Beery 2012; Giacalone 2008; Hubbard et al. 2013; Lewicki et al. 2013; Peeters 
2003), and the road is being paved for a much more intensified commercial use 
of space. This development is interesting from many different perspectives, and it 
evokes many complex ethical questions.
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Planetary protection, the way the term is used today within the astrobiology 
community, is essentially a technical term for measures aimed at avoiding biological 
contamination, either of extraterrestrial environments (forward contamination) or 
of our own Earth (back contamination) resulting from human space activities. The 
legal basis for planetary protection can be found in the Outer Space Treaty from 
1967, stating in Article IX that ‘Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer 
space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration 
of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in 
the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial 
matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose’ 
(UN General Assembly 1966).
As is usually the case with international treaties, it states over-arching principles 
rather than precise goals or instructions. We can therefore not conclude exactly 
what ‘harmful contamination’ means, or what needs to be done to avoid it, based 
solely on the treaty. The responsibility for setting up more detailed guidelines 
regarding planetary protection has fallen on the Committee for Space Research 
(COSPAR), under the International Council for Science (ICSU). The first Planetary 
Protection Policy developed by COSPAR was published in 1964. The latest planetary 
protection policy, put together by COSPAR’s Panel for Planetary Protection (PPP), 
was published in 2015 (Kminek and Rummel 2015). It specifies which degree of 
protection is needed for different types of activities (probe, lander, flyby, orbit) on 
different bodies (planets, moons, asteroids) depending on their estimated interest 
to astrobiology. Mars and Europa are particularly interesting to astrobiology, and 
there are therefore special requirements for flyby, orbiting and landing on, as well 
as sample return missions from these bodies. There are also special requirements 
for certain regions, so-called ‘Special Regions’ on Mars, where it is thought more 
likely that earth organisms could survive (Kminek and Rummel 2015).
Strictly speaking, the policies are recommendations and not legally binding 
(though the Outer Space Treaty brings in those countries that have ratified the 
treaty). In practice, the COSPAR guidelines are respected by the space agencies 
of the major space-faring nations, though they themselves typically specify the 
COSPAR recommendations even further to fit individual missions (see, for 
instance, https://planetaryprotection.nasa.gov/overview, accessed 9/2/2017).
When put in a wider context, it includes several intricate philosophical 
conundrums. In fact, both forward and back contamination have interesting 
ethical implications, but since my focus here is on extraterrestrial life, I will only 
discuss forward contamination in this chapter.
Planetary protection, astrobiology and commercial activities in space are three 
human endeavours that are in some ways very different, but that also have two 
major aspects in common: They are all related to human activities in space, and 
they all have the potential to affect living organisms in ways that need ethical 
deliberation. When these three activities are combined, we will get a whole set of 
new, and, from a philosophical point of view, exciting questions. The main aim 
of this chapter is to point at, explore and, to some extent, suggest ways to handle 
some of these questions.
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Astrobiology and Planetary Protection
Planetary protection is extremely important for astrobiology. When looking 
for extraterrestrial life, it is obviously crucial to avoid false positives due to 
contamination by earth life. If and when we ever find extraterrestrial life, it is also 
very important to be able to study it in its pristine form without contamination 
from earth life, and of course, most important of all, that the indigenous life is 
not driven to extinction by invasive earth organisms before it is even discovered. 
When sending unmanned as well as manned missions to other worlds, it is 
therefore vital to avoid contamination of that world. Considering how important 
planetary protection is to astrobiological research, it is easy to believe that is 
no conflict between the two. This is not completely true, however. Even though 
efforts to avoid contamination are quite sophisticated and considerable work is 
put into the process, we also know that complete sterilization of humans and 
machines is impossible (see Kim et al. 2013; La Duc et al. 2003;  2007; Moissl et 
al. 2008; Mahnert et al. 2015; Newcombe et al. 2005; Schuerger and Nicholson 
2016; Stieglmeier et al. 2009; Tepfer and Leach 2017; Dartnell et al. 2010 for some 
examples of the challenges involved). We can obviously never totally sterilize 
humans. If we did, the humans would die too. We can go somewhat further with 
machines but essentially, the same is true for them. The electronics in a rover is 
more sensitive than at least some earth microbes. We also know now that what 
kills some bacteria allows others to flourish. Interestingly, our efforts to sterilize 
exert a selective pressure in favour of strands that are resistant to these efforts. 
Planetary protection is thus something that comes in degrees and it will always 
be possible to do more or less than we already do. This means that we must make 
decisions about exactly how far we want to go. It would be easy to say that the more 
the better, but the only absolutely safe way would be not to send anything to any 
other world. As long as we want to go on exploring, in space as well as on Earth, 
we have to find a compromise between the importance of discovery and the risks 
we impose on the study objects in the process.
Another aspect to consider is that planetary protection, like everything else, 
comes at a cost in terms of time, work and money that could be used on other 
things, also worthwhile. The experience from the Viking landers, that were the 
most thoroughly decontaminated landers so far, confirms that decontamination 
can be prohibitively expensive (Newcombe et al. 2005). Schon (2009) opposes a 
higher standard of sterilization because it would mean higher costs, and some 
astrobiology researchers complain that even today’s standards are too high, or as 
one researcher put it: ‘Over the top’ (private communication).
These facts taken together show that protecting the life we are looking for and 
want to study is important, and so is shielding experiments from false positives. It 
also shows, however, that planetary protection comes with certain costs and that 
the search in itself also poses a very real danger to the extraterrestrial life we are 
looking for. If we still want to be able to look for and study extraterrestrial life, we 
need to find a balance between our efforts to find and study it and our efforts to 
protect it.
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COSPAR has provided an explicit answer as to where that balance can be 
struck, namely at the degree of planetary protection needed to give science 
enough time to find and study possible life (see, for instance, Sagan and Coleman 
1965; Kminek and Rummel 2015). They have thus chosen a degree of planetary 
protection that has a strictly defined purpose with clear limitations in both degree 
and time.
The aim of planetary protection, as it is formulated and applied by COSPAR, 
is sometimes stated as being a matter of ‘protecting the science’ rather than 
protecting extraterrestrial life as such. A more philosophically stringent 
way of putting it would be to say that extraterrestrial life is protected only 
because of its epistemic instrumental value. Here, ‘epistemic value’ refers to 
value that has to do with knowledge or the production of knowledge, while 
‘instrumental value’ refers to the value something has because of its ability 
to promote something else that has value (in this case, knowledge). Taken 
together, referring to the value of extraterrestrial life as epistemic instrumental 
value, means that extraterrestrial life has value as a source of knowledge, that 
is, as objects for study.
The question we should ask, however, is: Could it be possible that extraterrestrial 
life in addition to its value as study objects, also have other values? If it is, then 
we also need to ask: What practical consequences does that have for the relation 
between astrobiology and planetary protection?
It is conceivable that extraterrestrial life can have other values, but that these 
values will be sufficiently similar to the epistemic values, or be weaker or less 
vulnerable than the epistemic values, and thus confirm that the present guidelines 
for planetary protection are sufficient to also protect these values. Another 
possibility is that they have values that are even more important or more vulnerable, 
and that we will therefore need even stricter guidelines to achieve an even lower 
probability of contamination, compared with today. The most extreme scenario 
will, of course, be that we have to set the maximum acceptable probability of 
contamination so low that sending spacecraft from Earth to a potentially inhabited 
world will in practice (and maybe even in principle) be ruled out. This would be 
a very sad conclusion and it is not something I see as very plausible, but it at least 
needs to be discussed. Another and much more plausible possibility is that we will 
have to abolish time limits. If extraterrestrial life has value in any other way than 
as study objects, it is very hard to justify why they should only be protected for the 
time it takes to study them. Yet another possibility is that there will be restrictions 
on what we are allowed to do in order to find extraterrestrial life, and what we are 
allowed to do to them when we find them. Will we, for instance, be allowed to use 
destructive detection methods as was the case with the Viking experiments? (see 
Horowitz et al. 1972; Hubbard 1976; Klein 1978). Will we be allowed to bring them 
back to Earth to study them, and will we be allowed to dissect or perform other 
intrusive experiments on them?
What is important to remember is that these questions are not science questions. 
They are value questions. They cannot be settled by science alone, and this is where 
philosophy enters the picture.
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Let us summarize our options:
1. Extraterrestrial life has no other value than their epistemic value. In this 
case, all we have to do is to figure out the exact level of protection needed 
to protect their value as study objects as long as is needed to study them 
thoroughly, and then figure out how to achieve that level of protection. These 
tasks are by no means easy but at least they are scientific and technological/
methodological tasks. If this is our conclusion, there will be no more need 
for philosophy.
2. Extraterrestrial life has at least one other kind of value but it is a kind of 
value that does not warrant any extra protection in addition to the planetary 
protection guidelines. The practical implications of this conclusion are the 
same as for 1.
3. Extraterrestrial life has at least one other kind of value that is sufficiently 
strong to warrant protection but it is a kind of value that does not warrant 
any extra protection in addition to the planetary protection guidelines. It 
does, however, warrant limitations as to what we are allowed to do to detect 
it, study it or utilize it in some other way. In this case, the present level of 
planetary protection is probably sufficient, but other restrictions need to be 
set regarding detection methods and what we will be allowed to do to this life 
once we find it. The latter concerns will not be of direct concern for planetary 
protection the way it is presently defined, but it has to be handled some way. 
One way of handling it would be to widen the present interpretation of the 
term ‘planetary protection’, which would call for a reinterpretation of the 
Outer Space Treaty. Another way would be to set up an additional treaty to 
handle these questions. Both these options would require a body that can 
handle the details in a similar way to what COSPAR is doing today. This could 
be done by extending the mandate of COSPAR to also deal with these issues, 
or by instantiating a completely new organization for this purpose, or to give 
this mandate to some other existing organization.
4. Extraterrestrial life has also at least one other kind of value that is strong 
enough (it could be stronger, weaker or equal to its value as study objects) to 
warrant protection but that has no end point in time. In this case, we need 
to abolish the time limit for planetary protection, which will, in turn, affect 
how we calculate the maximum acceptable probability of contamination for 
individual missions.
5. Extraterrestrial life has at least one other value that is strong enough or a 
number of other values that together are strong enough (if one believes in the 
accumulation of values) to make it trump all other values. In this case, it will 
not be a matter of finding a balance. We simply have to stop doing anything 
that could interfere with this life.
Deciding which one of these options is the correct one is too big a question to be 
answered in this chapter. Since it is a value question, it is not subject to the same 
process of shrinking the room for interpretations that empirical findings provide 
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for scientific theories. We will thus probably never reach a situation where we 
can all agree on one particular option. This does not mean the discussion is 
meaningless, however. On the contrary, an ongoing discussion that can shape 
the public policy regarding where to strike the balance between exploration 
and planetary protection, and between these two and a wider societal and 
ethical perspective, will be of crucial importance in order to make the policy 
decisions as ethically justifiable as possible. Later in this chapter, we will discuss 
some alternative ways in which extraterrestrial life can have value and what 
implications that may have. Before we get to that, it is time to introduce another 
complication, however.
Adding Commercial Space Use
In the previous section, we found that the relation between astrobiology and 
planetary protection is more complicated than one might expect at first sight. In 
this section, we will show how things become even more complicated when we 
add commercial space use to the formula.
The question of legal rights for commercial initiatives in space is very important. 
Anyone who invests major sums of money in an activity wants to make sure that 
they will not lose their investments because it turns out afterwards that they did 
not have the right to the resources they extract. It is also important to have laws 
in place that regulate the relations between different companies from different 
countries, bound by different laws in their home countries, but trying to coexist 
in space.
There are also questions of coexisting with other players with other agendas, 
such as the scientific community. It can be expected that space research and 
commercial space projects will prove to be very useful for each other. Space 
research is necessary for commercial companies to make sound business 
decisions about their activities in space. Commercial space companies will also 
be, and to some extent already are, useful for science. They are, for example, 
already providing launch capacities. This service will probably be the most 
valuable commercial contribution to space science, at least in the short term. 
Many hope that private launch solutions will be more cost efficient than those 
provided by major national and international space agencies such as NASA, ESA 
and Roscosmos. In the future, space mining may also provide access to resources, 
such as fuel and construction materials in space, which will make it possible for 
the scientific community to reach further with more ease and less money, and to 
build and operate observatories in space, etc.
In addition to the many opportunities for cooperation that can be expected, 
there will, however, also be points of conflict. Will planetary protection be such 
a point of conflict? There are not yet any commercial activities on Mars or any 
other extraterrestrial body, and the most immediate plans for space tourism are 
only about sending people into Low Earth Orbit, or even just about making a 
short ‘jump’ into space to let the passengers experience a short moment of 
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weightlessness. Likewise, the immediate plans when it comes to space mining are 
about asteroids, which are considered by COSPAR to be among the least probable 
places to find life in our solar system (Kminek and Rummel 2015). Even so, at 
least one company has foreseen that their operations might be controversial. 
They have therefore produced a web page entitled ‘Asteroids are cold, dead 
worlds’, seemingly aimed at setting the reader to rest that asteroid mining really 
does not have any objectionable environmental impact on the target bodies, and 
also that mining and using resources from asteroids will even be a good thing 
for the earth environment (https://deepspaceindustries.com/asteroids-are-col 
d-dead-worlds/ accessed 03/01/2017).
It is not a very controversial assumption, however, that when the time comes to 
exploit the resources on a potentially inhabited world, or to establish it as a tourist 
destination, we will see conflicts between those who think that we have looked for 
life long enough on the world in question and that it is now time to give the green 
light for development, and those who think that there is still a chance there might 
be life that we should not endanger.
It all depends on the values at stake, of course. If we assume that extraterrestrial 
life only has value as a study object, it might be very difficult to resist exploitation 
even if it potentially puts indigenous life at risk. Economic value is privileged by 
our society, and when the value of knowledge as such is set against economic 
value, the former usually loses.
An alternative possibility is that extraterrestrial life, in addition to its value as a 
study object, also has economic value. Just like with the value as a study object, this 
is also a form of instrumental value: Something has economic value because it can 
generate money. Can extraterrestrial life have instrumental value in this way, and 
what does it mean for the relations between astrobiology, commercial interests 
and planetary protection if it does?
Cockell (2011a) mentions bioengineering as an example. He distinguishes 
between the economic value of extraterrestrial life that is related to us (spread 
through the solar system according to the so-called panspermia theory) 
compared to if it is not related to us. This distinction makes good sense. It is 
easy to imagine that a microbe that is genetically well adapted to life on another 
world might contain adaptations that we will want to insert into earth bacteria 
and use for different purposes. In such cases, it clearly makes things easier if 
they are genetically related. If they are, we will be able to transfer the properties 
in question to earth life by transferring the relevant genes from extraterrestrial 
microbes to earth microbes. Interesting properties could, for instance, be the 
ability to survive high doses of radiation, which could be useful if we, for example, 
want to engineer microbes to do work inside a nuclear reactor or disaster area, 
or aboard a spaceship travelling between Earth and Mars. An ability to extract 
energy from the Sun in a very efficient way would be another example of a useful 
property that might be found in microbial life on worlds further from the Sun. 
In addition, it is also easy to imagine that life that is already adapted to life on 
another world but is also compatible with earth life will be useful if we want to 
transfer traits from earth microbes to extraterrestrial microbes in order to tailor 
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make microbes that future space-dwellers can use to produce anything from food 
to fuel in their new habitat.
When it comes to extraterrestrial life that is not genetically compatible with 
earth life, it would be more difficult to transfer properties between them and earth 
life in either direction, even if not in principle impossible (maybe we will be able to 
extract the relevant information from their equivalent to a genome and translate it 
into the language of DNA). Even if extraterrestrial life cannot be genetically mixed 
with earth life, they could be used for bioengineering, however, though without 
involving earth life in the process.
If we find extraterrestrial life that has value as a resource for bioengineering, it 
could mean that the aims of science and business actually converge when it comes 
to planetary protection. In order to use extraterrestrial microbes for engineering, 
they will need to be protected so they do not go extinct, but they will also need 
to be found and studied. This indicates that the degree of protection suitable for 
extraterrestrial life as resources for bioengineering could be very similar to the 
degree of protection suitable for extraterrestrial life in their role as study objects. 
There is one difference, however, namely that the limit for how long they need 
protection may not be the same. If we want to use them for bioengineering, they 
need to be protected beyond the time it takes to study them. On the other hand, 
the time it takes to study them enough to map their economically useful properties 
may be shorter than the time it takes to study them thoroughly from a scientific 
perspective. The value of extraterrestrial life as study objects and as resources for 
bioengineering may thus make different demands on the time-span during which 
they have to be protected, and therefore, also on the degree of protection. Which 
type of value that will be more demanding is not possible to say before we have 
actually found them.
Another way in which extraterrestrial life can have economic value is in the form 
of entertainment. This too demands some degree of planetary protection, though 
the demands will be different compared to the demands from bioengineering. We 
can easily imagine that the interest in seeing extraterrestrial life with one’s own 
eyes will be immense. This value can be exploited in two different ways, either by 
bringing people to their world, or by bringing the extraterrestrials to us. Both these 
alternatives will put extra pressure on planetary protection. We have mentioned 
that it is impossible to completely sterilize humans. This means that bringing 
human tourists to see extraterrestrial life in situ carries a substantial probability 
of being destructive. If they are compatible with earth life, it might also imply a 
risk for the tourists. Bringing the extraterrestrials to Earth will for obvious reasons 
also imply risks, in this case for us and other earth life. Sterilization will not be an 
option in this case (we do not want to kill the life we have brought such a long way 
to see). 
All in all, we can conclude that if we look at the question of planetary protection 
from the perspective of science or from the perspective of business, and even when 
we consider different business perspectives, the result may differ considerably. 
Considering the expected increase in commercial space use, this obviously 
complicates things for science as well as for planetary protection.
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Does Extra-terrestrial Life have Instrumental Value 
Other than Economic and Epistemic Value? 
Are there any other ways in which extraterrestrial life can have instrumental value 
than the two forms of value discussed above? The answer seems to largely depend 
on which properties they turn out to have. Different properties mean different uses 
and thus different bases for instrumental value. We can be sure that they will have 
epistemic value, and it seems plausible that they will also have economic value in 
some form, if not for bioengineering, at least as entertainment. Saying anything else 
about their potential instrumental value before we have found them, and thus before 
we know their properties in any detail, is difficult. What we can say, is that whatever 
kind and degree of instrumental value they have, that value has to compete with 
other values. If we find other resources that can be extracted from their world and 
they somehow will be in the way of that, it will be hard to fight for their protection, 
just as it has been and still is with life on our own planet. If we can establish that 
the extraterrestrial life forms also have non-instrumental value, it would definitely 
change the game. It might still not be enough to demand a higher degree of planetary 
protection or to say that there are certain things we will not be allowed to do to them, 
but it might, and therefore, I think it is our duty to investigate the possibility.
Does Extra-terrestrial Life Have Non-instrumental Value
Can we imagine extraterrestrial life having value beyond their instrumental value? 
This question often takes the form of a question whether extraterrestrial life has 
intrinsic value (see, for instance, Cockell 2011a, b; Cockell and Horneck 2006). Since 
different authors tend to use the term ‘intrinsic value’ in different ways, this way of 
formulating the question is hopelessly opaque, however. Attempts to untangle the 
different meanings of the term (O’Neil 1997; 1992; Persson 2008; Rabinowicz and 
Rønnow-Rasmussen 1999) have revealed at least four different meanings:
1. Value as an end in itself, independently of what other values it can promote 
(also known as ‘end value’, ‘final value’ or just ‘non-instrumental value’), 
2. value that is inherent in the phenomenon in question and thus independent 
of its relations to other phenomena (also known as ‘inherent value’ or ‘non-
relational value’),
3. value that is independent of whether it is valued by someone (also known as 
‘objective value’), 
4. moral standing, which means that the phenomenon in question has interests 
of its own that need to be considered by anyone who has the ambition of 
acting morally.
Strictly speaking, the question of moral standing is not about the value of the 
phenomenon in question, but rather about whether things can have value to it.
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For the purpose of this chapter, we only need to pursue two of the different 
meanings of ‘intrinsic value’, namely, the first (‘end value’), and the last (that is, 
moral standing). We thus need to ask: Does extraterrestrial life have end value, 
and/or does it have moral standing?
Does Extraterrestrial Life Have End Value?
Before we start investigating whether extraterrestrial life can have end value 
we need to be aware that instrumental value and end value are not mutually 
exclusive. It is perfectly possible to have both. Something can have value as 
an end in itself, and also be a useful means to something else. A watch can, 
for instance, be very useful for keeping time but also be a precious heirloom. 
A trusty old car that has been with its owner through many adventures can 
be convenient for getting from A to B and thus have instrumental value, but 
when it is stolen, it can still evoke a feeling in the owner that she has lost 
something more dear to her than just a means of transportation. It can have end 
value to her in addition to its instrumental value. The fact that we have found 
several ways in which extraterrestrial life can have instrumental value does not 
therefore compel us to give either a positive or a negative answer to whether it 
has end value.
So, can extraterrestrial life have end value? The simple answer to this question 
is: Yes, anything can be valued as an end in itself by anyone! This is true. We 
might, however, also want to ask whether it is reasonable to value extraterrestrials 
as ends in themselves. The answer to that question is also yes, for several reasons. 
One reason is that life as such seems to be one of these things that most people 
value for its own sake independently of its instrumental use. A large part of the 
motivation behind the environmental movement can, for instance, be attributed 
to this intuition (Persson 2008). The fact that we talk about extraterrestrial life 
can add to this value, at least based on the huge interest among the general 
public for the question of whether extraterrestrial life exists, an interest that is 
supposedly not only based on the value of extraterrestrial life as a study object or 
other instrumental values it might bring. In addition, the circumstances during 
which we find extraterrestrial life, as well as what kind of life we find, might 
add to its end value. Being first seems to be a property that is a strong basis for 
end value for many people. The first extraterrestrial life we find will therefore 
surely have end value in its capacity of being the first discovered extraterrestrial 
life. Uniqueness is another property that is a basis for end value to many people 
(Persson 2017). As long as we only find one instance, it will therefore also have 
end value because it is unique. If we find extraterrestrial life on more than one 
world, it will not be unique in this way, but since life on one world will probably 
differ considerably from life on another world, it can be safely assumed that they 
will all have properties that make them unique in one way or another (Persson 
2017). In fact, this is true even of the different forms of life we already know on 
our own planet today. All life on Earth is related but has evolved in many different 
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ways, resulting in an almost endless number of unique solutions. Considering 
the differences in physical conditions between different worlds, we have reason 
to believe that this will be the case to an even higher degree if we look at life on 
different worlds, and this as such seems like a good reason to attach end value to 
extraterrestrial life.
It can also be expected that the extent to which the life we find has properties 
that make it interesting or exciting will play a role. More complex life will 
probably be considered more valuable than less complex life independently of 
whether it makes the life in question more instrumentally useful or not. In the 
same way, life that expresses a more complex behaviour or is aesthetically more 
pleasing to us will probably be considered more valuable than life with a less 
complex behaviour or that is less aesthetically pleasing. Another property that, 
with a high degree of certainty, can be said to add end value to a life form, from 
our perspective, is its ability to communicate with us. The more we can interact 
with it, the more exciting will it be, which in turn will make us value it higher 
as an end in itself, no matter whether it makes it more or less useful to us.
To what degree a certain life form has end value thus depends on its particular 
properties, but we can also conclude that all extraterrestrial life will have some 
degree of end value based on the fact that it is life, and that it is extraterrestrial.
Does Extraterrestrial Life Have Moral Standing?
Having moral standing, or being a moral object as it is also called, is not the same 
as having end value. Strictly speaking, it is not about the value of the object at 
all. To say that you have moral standing means rather that things have (positive 
or negative) value to you, and that is something that has to be considered by 
others. 
To answer the question of whether extraterrestrial life has moral standing, 
we need to consider two things: What kind of life are we talking about (which 
properties will it have), and what are the criteria for having moral standing (which 
properties are necessary for having moral standing)?
Obviously, we do not know what kind of life we will find, and a philosopher’s 
job (in spite of popular belief) is not to speculate about what is at least in principle 
an empirical question, but rather to analyse and scrutinize the non-empirical 
questions, so let us keep an open mind regarding the question of what kind of life 
we might find, and consider what different theories about moral standing have to 
say about the moral standing of different kinds of life, but with the proviso that 
planetary protection is, given current technology, only applicable to activities in 
our own solar system, and that there seems to be a rather strong belief among 
astrobiologists that as long as we talk about our own solar system, we will probably 
not find anything very complex. I will, therefore, put extra focus on what the 
different theories about moral standing have to say about the simplest kinds of 
microbial life.
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The question of what it takes to have moral standing is intensely discussed in 
environmental ethics on our own planet, and the answers are typically divided into 
the following categories:
1. Anthropocentrism – all and only humans have moral status (Carruthers 1994; 
Kant 1998; Smith 2009).
2. Biocentrism – all and only living beings have moral status (Schweitzer 1976; 
Goodpaster 1978; Cockell 2005;  2011a).
3. Sentientism – all and only sentient entities have moral status (see, for instance, 
Bernstein 1998; Clark 1977; de Grazia 1996; Helm 2002; Levine 1997; O’Neil 
1997; Regan 1983; 2001; Singer 1993; 1995).
4. Ecocentrism – Species and biomes have moral standing in addition to living 
beings (see, for instance, Callicott 1980;  1985; 1987; 1992; 1999; Johnson 
1991; 1992; Leopold 1970; Plumwood 1991; Rolston 1986; 1987; 1988; 
1994; 1999).
Here I will briefly discuss what these theories imply for extraterrestrial life (for an 
extended discussion see Persson 2012).
Anthropocentrism 
If we want to apply this theory to the question of whether extraterrestrial life 
has moral standing, we need to distinguish both between different kinds of 
extraterrestrial life and between different versions of the theory. If we adhere to the 
simplest version of the theory, namely that the criterion for having moral standing 
is simply to belong to the species Homo sapiens, then we can be quite sure that no 
extraterrestrial life will ever have moral standing. Even in the seemingly unlikely 
event that we find extraterrestrial life forms that look just like us and share most of 
our features, they will not be the same species as we, and thus not human in this 
very strict sense.
The basis for anthropocentrism is usually not species membership as such, 
however. Instead, the focus is typically on some property that, on this planet, is 
supposed to only be possessed by humans. Examples of such properties could be 
intelligence or language skills on a level that is beyond what is found among other 
species on our planet.
Not even the most optimistic astrobiologists believe that we will find 
extraterrestrial life with any humanlike properties in our solar system. This means 
that if we accept anthropocentrism, we do not have to worry about considering the 
moral status of extraterrestrial life in connection with planetary protection, as long 
as we, as is the case here, only talk about forward contamination, and as long as we 
stay within our solar system.1
1. See Lehmann Imfeld, this volume, for a discussion of the ethical implications of 
anthropocentrism in the terraforming of Mars.
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If we extend our discussion outside the solar system, we do not know what we 
might find and it is at least not impossible that we will find life forms that share 
some of our properties. Applying anthropocentrism on our relations with them, 
the result may be mostly detrimental to us, however. If we base moral status on 
the property of being human in a strictly biological sense, how can we argue 
against any possible alien invaders, who by the same logic claim that they do 
not have any moral duties to consider our interests since we do not belong to 
their species?
If we instead use, for instance, intelligence as the basis for moral standing and 
they are much more intelligent than we are, maybe so much more that our level 
of intelligence, in their eyes, is not significantly different from the intelligence 
level among the earth animals that we use for our own purposes today, what then? 
Should we just succumb to our new role as slaves or food for our new overlords 
or do we have any moral basis from which we can argue that their treatment of us 
is wrong? It might be hard to do that and at the same time maintain that we have 
the right to treat other, from our perspective, lower species, the way we do today.
Biocentrism
At first sight, it may seem as if biocentrism would demand a very high standard 
of planetary protection, including sterilization of all equipment aimed at, or 
in risk of landing at potentially inhabited worlds. If we think one step further, 
however, we realize that what is sterilization other than the systematic mass 
killing of earth microbes? It would, from a biocentric point of view, be very 
hard to motivate planetary protection measures that imply the killing of 
countless numbers of actual life microbes in order to protect merely possible 
extraterrestrial life based on the moral standing of all life. It thus seems that 
the conclusion has to be that we have to completely abstain from a central 
component of planetary protection, that is, sterilization. Instead, we have to 
decide whether to go without any sterilization measures or not to go there at all. 
This decision presumably has to be based on how probable we think it is that the 
target world is inhabited and how probable we think it is that it is inhabitable 
for earth microbes.
The latter alternative (not going at all), is perhaps too restrictive even from a 
biocentric perspective, however. Granting moral standing for extraterrestrial life 
does not necessarily mean that we are not allowed to do anything on an inhabited 
planet. How prohibitive an ethical theory is depends on how we answer all the 
ethical questions, not just how we answer the question of what it takes to have 
moral standing. If we, for instance, subscribe to a utilitarian view of ethics, the 
interests of all moral objects have to be considered and weighed into the equation. 
The outcome depends on the whole equation containing all affected interests 
according to their relative strength.
In either case, if we decide that it is acceptable to go to their world, we will 
have certain obligations to protect the extraterrestrials. Even if this will not take 
the form of sterilization of spacecraft, it can take other forms that will affect the 
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study of these life forms. It may, for instance, imply that we have to abstain from 
destructive experiments (that is, experiments in which the study objects are killed 
or injured) and from taking them from their own environment and bring them 
back to Earth for closer examination.
Sentientism
As long as we stay within our solar system, sentientism probably has the same 
immediate consequence for planetary protection as anthropocentrism, namely, 
that the life we expect that we might find in will not have any moral standing. There 
is, of course, some difference in probability. We do not know what hides under the 
ice of Europa, for instance. Even though the probability that it will be sentient is 
very low, it is not as low as the extremely low probability that it is human-like.
If we look beyond our present capabilities and think about the implications 
of sentientism when we achieve the technological ability to detect biosignatures 
outside our solar system, the most obvious challenge will be to distinguish 
between sentient but not intelligent life on one hand, and non-sentient life on the 
other. This is in some cases a difficult challenge even on our own planet. When 
we encounter life that might be radically different from life as we know it and has 
evolved under radically different circumstances, how do we then decide whether 
it is sentient? This is a question that we cannot yet answer, though that does not of 
course mean that we should abstain from using sentience as the decisive criterion 
for moral standing if this is the criterion that makes the most sense from an ethical 
perspective (which seems like a very reasonable assumption). It means, however, 
that we have to be extremely careful when the time comes to make a decision 
about whether a particular extraterrestrial is sentient or not. 
Ecocentrism
If we accept ecocentrism, what implications would it have for planetary protection? 
One implication that is potentially very important, is that we not only will have to 
consider any individuals that we find, but also should avoid altering competitive 
relationships between species, or otherwise interfere in their relationships. This 
means, for instance, that not drastically changing the environment on their world.
On the other hand, killing some instances of individual extraterrestrial life 
would not be a big problem for the ecocentrist as long we do not threaten the 
whole species or the environment on the planet. This is potentially very important 
for the relationship between planetary protection and astrobiology. A theory that 
allows you to kill off a few, or a few hundred thousand individuals, as long as 
you do not threaten the species or the function of ecosystems, seems perfect for 
justifying both decontamination, where uncountable numbers of presumably 
very common earth microbes are killed off, and research that includes the 
killing of a number of individual extraterrestrial microbes in the process. On the 
other hand, though both anthropocentrism and sentientism deny moral status 
to individual microbes and for species, they accept that species can have value 
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(though not moral standing). Both these theories would thus provide exactly the 
same allowances as ecocentrism as long as we talk about microbial life. That is, 
from an anthropocentric or sentientistic point of view, it would also be okay to 
kill individual microbes as long as we do not threaten the species, given that the 
species have the kind of instrumental or non-instrumental value discussed above.
As long as we talk about microbial life and are only concerned about forward 
contamination, anthropocentrism and sentientism thus have the same practical 
implications as ecocentrism. If we find sentient or even intelligent life, on the other 
hand, the practical implications would differ considerably. In these cases, sentientism 
and anthropocentrism would set restrictions for what we are allowed to do with the 
individual organisms that ecocentrism would not. Ecocentrism does accept some 
level of moral status for sentient non-human individuals but it is much lower than 
the moral status of the species. The status of human or human-like life according 
to ecocentrism differs between different versions of the theory. According to some 
versions of ecocentrism (Rolston 1986; 1987; 1988; 1994;  1999), human individual 
life has a special status that puts it above other individuals and gives us some unique 
rights in relation to other species and ecosystems. Exactly which implications this has 
when we talk about human interest in exploration as well as in commercial activities 
is not really worked out by its proponents, though a fair guess would be that we would 
have relatively generous rights to explore and exploit individual extraterrestrial life 
as long as it does not threaten entire species or their environments.
According to another version of ecocentrism called land ethics, extraterrestrial 
life is explicitly excluded from the realm of moral objects (Callicott 1992). If we 
find life on another planet, we will for the first time have to deal with life that we are 
not related to, even distantly (provided of course that life has not been transferred 
between Earth and this other world in either direction). This means in turn that 
according to land ethics, extraterrestrial life cannot be included in our moral circle.
A general point to consider when discussing ecocentrism in relation to space 
exploration and exploitation is that ecocentrists usually do not show much 
concern for non-biological systems, which means that a world populated by 
intelligent robots will not have any moral standing according to this theory, even if 
they are conscious and/or intelligent. A maybe more immediate concern is that it 
is also unclear what happens to the moral standing of an extraterrestrial organism 
that is taken from its natural habitat and moved to Earth. When that happens, 
the organism will no longer fulfil its role in the species and ecosystem to which 
it originally belonged. Advocates of ecocentrism tend to consider domesticated 
animals and animals in zoos more as artefacts than as ‘real’ animals (Johnson 
1991; Rolston 1988;  1994). It is possible that extraterrestrial life brought back to 
Earth will be considered in the same way and thus lose most of their moral status.
Summary and Conclusions
The relation between astrobiology, commercial space activities and planetary 
protection evokes a number of philosophical questions, not least value questions. 
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Value questions cannot be handled by science alone but they are, nonetheless, of 
utmost importance to science as well as for commercial space initiatives. In this 
chapter, I have identified and tried to throw some philosophical light on some of 
these questions.
The most basic value question in the intersection of astrobiology, commercial 
space activity and planetary protection is, of course, which values are at stake? It 
turns out that the value that solely motivates planetary protection is the value of 
extraterrestrial life as study objects, that is, the instrumental epistemic value of 
extraterrestrial life. It was also found, however, that this is not the only possible 
value at stake. For the commercial actors, the economic value of extraterrestrial life 
is probably of greater importance, which evokes another value question, namely, 
how the epistemic and economic values of extraterrestrial life relate to each other. It 
was found that in order to utilize extraterrestrial life for economic purposes, it has 
to be studied, so in that respect, the two values seem to be compatible. Extracting 
the economic value of extraterrestrial life can, on the other hand, interfere with the 
study of them, while the assumption that the study has an end point in time might 
mean that the economic value of extraterrestrial life calls for continued protection 
beyond the time needed to study it. Another point of conflict that is potentially 
more serious is that other things such as non-living resources may have a higher 
economic value than the extraterrestrial organisms. This can be expected to lead 
to conflicts over how long the search for, and subsequent study of extraterrestrial 
life, with accompanying high standards for planetary protection should be allowed 
to go on.
It is also plausible that extra-terrestrial life has other forms of value, instrumental 
value as well as end value. Exactly which values and how valuable will depend on 
the specific properties of the extraterrestrial life. All extraterrestrial life will share 
a minimum end value, supervening on it being alive and extraterrestrial, which 
includes an aspect of uniqueness. This, in turn, should be enough to motivate 
abolishing the time limit on planetary protection set by its value as study objects.
Another important question that has to be looked into is whether extraterrestrial 
life, in addition to any value it might have, also has moral standing. There are 
different theories about what it takes to have moral standing, which means the 
answer to this question depends on a combination of what kind of life we find and 
which theory we use.
How should we handle the conclusion that it is not just possible, but very 
reasonable to assign other values to extraterrestrial life, including economic 
value and other instrumental values, as well as end value, in addition to its 
epistemic value?
One way forward would be to widen the basis of planetary protection to also 
include these other values. A problem in connection with this suggestion is that 
planetary protection, the way it is done today, is based on a well-established 
international treaty, the so-called Outer Space Treaty. This treaty is the basis 
for national legislation regarding not just planetary protection, but also many 
other space-related questions (UN General Assembly 1966). Making changes 
in the value basis behind planetary protection might violate this treaty and 
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subsequently national and international legislation. An alternative way of 
handling the value issues identified in this chapter would be to complement 
the Outer Space Treaty with another treaty – an interplanetary environmental 
protection treaty.
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